LA Kings: It's Time To Get With The Times

A quick aside. While usually my analysis is statistical in nature, this isn't going to really be that. While there is an underlying philosophical and statistical theme, these are observations of what's gone wrong for the LA Kings through my lens.

To start, let's take a look back.

How We Got Here

When the LA Kings made the playoffs in 2021-22, it was a big step forward for the organization that had impressively navigated through a relatively short rebuild. The team had their core in place, General Manager Rob Blake made some key acquisitions of impact NHL players in the likes of Viktor Arvidsson and Phillip Danault and we started to see some growth in the younger players like Trevor Moore, Jordan Spence, and Sean Durzi while the excitement around Quinton Byfield and freshly drafted Brandt Clarke was palpable.

There wasn't any shame in losing a hard-fought seven-game series to Edmonton, particularly without the injured Drew Doughty. It was an overall positive season.

Expectations rose slightly for the 2022-23 campaign, especially after that summer's acquisition of Kevin Fiala. While goaltending that season was the most immediate issue, the far more concerning position for me was the blueline.

As that season's trade deadline approached, there were heavy rumors about the Kings acquiring Jakob Chychrun. When this didn't happen, LA pivoted to Vladislav Gavrikov. An uninspiring acquisition in my eyes, but he formed a formidable partnership with Matt Roy and they were excellent for the final 20 games of the regular season.

Unfortunately for LA, it was the subsequent decisions that were puzzling. The acquisition of Gavrikov would slot the big Russian into the second pair, where the right-handed Durzi had been playing on his off-side. The thing is, Durzi handled his duties on his off side as well as could be expected even if it wasn't ideal.

Rather than keep Durzi on the left side and pair him with the puck-moving Sean Walker on the team's third pair, the Kings decided it was best to keep Alex Edler in the lineup every night. Thus instilling a defense corps with four defensive defensemen with limited puck-moving abilities. Good enough to get them to the playoffs and defeated by a superior Oilers team for the second straight season.

I point out that decision because it was foreshadowing the thought process of the LA Kings' brass that offseason.

The summer of 2023 was crucial for Blake. After back-to-back playoff appearances, the time had come for them to take the next step and get past the first round. When we look back, this will be the summer that does him in.

The Blueline

A need for LA was very much a top-four left-shot defenseman. Gavrikov was now a free agent and Edler wasn't coming back, so there were holes to fill on the back end. The Kings would trade Sean Walker as part of a salary dump to get rid of Cal Petersen's contract. A move celebrated by many, but I wasn't about to give kudos to Blake for giving away assets just to get rid of his own mistake; especially when they acquired over $2 million in AAV of Ivan Provorov's contract in the process.

With the organizational depth on the right side of the blue line, the move of the underrated Walker was understandable. Durzi had established himself as an NHLer and Brandt Clarke and Jordan Spence were knocking on the door. That depth would take another hit when Durzi was traded to Arizona to free up cap space and help acquire (then sign) Pierre-Luc Dubois (more on him later).

But it wasn't just the Dubois move that required cap space. The LA Kings still needed a top-four left-shot defenseman. And this is where Blake and Co. had a decision to make.

After years of rigid structure implemented by the team and head coach Todd McLellan, was it time to evolve and look for more skillful defensemen? Or stay the course with the defensive structure that saw them ousted in the first round in back-to-back seasons? The trades of Walker and Durzi should have been indicators that it wasn't the former. They then re-signed Gavrikov to a two-year $5.875 AAV extension. Quite the cap hit for a one-dimensional player built only to fit LA's 1-3-1 system.

If you squinted, though, you could see the logic given how well Gavrikov and Roy played together. But if LA signed Gavrikov thinking they'd get the same 20-game snapshot over an 82-game season they were sorely mistaken.

There was still hope, however. The bottom pair wasn't yet filled. This was a perfect opportunity to see an injection of skill. Could LA actually play Brandt Clarke and Jordan Spence (gasp!) in the same defense group? While I had my hopes, I wasn't stupid. But even I didn't see what was coming. Understanding Clarke could need some seasoning in Ontario, I thought Blake could sign a stop-gap defenseman to a one-year deal, but someone that offered a little more skill to the blueline. A player in the mold of Erik Gustafsson. Or, this could have been an opportunity for Jacob Moverare or Tobias Bjornfot to earn a spot and see if they could be NHL defensemen. And if not, the Kings had Clarke to fall back on.

Instead, Blake was fooled by the idea that the Kings needed "size" and "toughness" to beat Edmonton, so he went out and signed Andreas Englund to a not one, but two-year deal, to (quite literally) anchor the team's bottom pair.

Pause for a second to realize that at this moment Blake not only doubled but tripled down on the notion that despite back-to-back losses to the Oilers in the first round, this is the way to beat them. You beat Edmonton with big, slow, poor puck-moving defensemen. That's 'The Plan'.

These decisions show an incredible lack of understanding of how hockey is played in 2024.

Now the LA Kings have lost for the third straight year to a far superior Oilers team and we'll again hear shouts of the team not being "tough" enough or "big" enough and, frankly, it's nonsense. The team isn't skilled enough - particularly on the blueline - period.

I want to be clear, you need to play tough and be willing to endure the physical play in playoffs, I'm not ignoring that. But to have that be your main (dare I say only) attribute is a recipe for first-round losses.

Speaking of Brandt Clarke, his usage this year was bizarre. The team's prized prospect was brought up in early January during the team's funk. This opened the door to wonder if the team would finally get a little creative, maybe get him into the same defense group as Spence, even if not on the same pairing.

Ah, but this is LA. You can't have too much skill on your blue line. No. Instead, he swapped places with Spence - while Englund played every game -  for a few weeks in a scenario that couldn't have made less sense. Clarke was flourishing in the AHL at the time so while he was deserving of the call-up, he wasn't deserving of the press box. Nor was Spence, who had a strong season in his first full campaign, despite playing with a partner who was very limited in what he could do.

It was another example of a total lack of creativity and an unwillingness to allow the slightest bit of risk into the roster. There's no bigger failure of this regime than the construction of the defense. Look around the NHL, especially at the defensemen on the top teams. If you build a defense that cannot move the puck or contribute to the offense you limit your ability to score goals. If you can't score, you can't win. Blake hasn't figured this out as he built his roster for a prior era.

The Structure

When is enough, enough? Will the third straight first-round exit to a highly skilled Oilers team be the breaking point? We should hope so.

Here we sit in the year 2024 and Rob Blake has the LA Kings playing a 1-3-1 neutral zone trap style of hockey like we're still in the dead puck era. This notion that "defense wins championships" is a fallacy in the modern NHL. Sure, you can't go full Don Granato but there has to be an embracing of the modern era of hockey; particularly when you go out and trade for someone with the skill level of Kevin Fiala. And especially when you draft Jordan Spence and Brandt Clarke. Why on earth do you acquire these players only to neuter them in an overly rigid system?

But we're told it works. Except here's the thing - it doesn't. Zero playoff series wins in ten years. Someone explain to me how that is "working". And I don't want to hear how they play the system that suits their players. The easy fix is to construct your roster with more versatile players; something Blake apparently has little interest in. Hence his re-signing of Gavrikov, his signing of Englund, and his signing of Trevor Lewis. In terms of on-ice value and capabilities, they just don't offer much.

Not only that but in Lewis' case, he is blocking a slew of forwards. Be it Carl Grundstrom, Arthur Kaliyev, Alex Turcotte, Akil Thomas or Samuel Fagemo. Each one of these players offers a higher ceiling than Trevor Lewis. But they don't fit the rigid structure as well as Lewis, a fourth-line player in his prime.

On Gavrikov, he's an adequate defensive defenseman, my biggest gripe here is the Kings are littered with them. He's redundant. If LA did not have Mikey Anderson, Matt Roy, and Andreas Englund I'd be more open to Gavrikov (though not at his current AAV). This again is Blake filling his roster with low-upside players and wondering why it's not working.

Pierre-Luc Dubois

As someone who was a big fan of the Dubois trade, I'm not going to sugarcoat it, it was a terrible first season. 2023-24 was a career-worst 40-point season for the 25-year-old when the expectations were that he'd be a key impact player for the Kings, helping get them over the hump.

But let's be honest, Dubois didn't go from a player coming off back-to-back 60+ point seasons and a 0.74 points per game player in Winnipeg to someone who is a 40-point player overnight. Dubois needs to shoulder much of the blame here (clearly) as he did not live up to expectations. But you know who else needs to shoulder some of the blame? The LA Kings.

LA acquired a player who had been a top-six center (and at times, winger) his entire career playing with established NHL talent. Yet after investing multiple assets to acquire Dubois and sign him to a significant contract, the team decided to put him in a third-line role where his most common linemate was a first-year NHL player who wasn't expected to be on the roster in Alex Laferriere. Those two had a revolving door of wingers throughout the season. Moreover, Dubois' most common on-ice teammates after Laferriere at 5-on-5 this season were Matt Roy and Andreas Englund. Gee, I wonder why he didn't produce?

This season was Dubois' third-lowest time-on-ice per game in his career at 5-on-5 and yet was his highest in terms of assists per 60 minutes at 5-on-5, despite inconsistent linemates.

When Dubois was acquired the thought - or at least my thought - was this would slot Phillip Danault into a third-line role he'd be better suited for. Remember, everyone was thoroughly impressed with Danault for putting up 50 points in back-to-back seasons. Can someone tell me why he was automatically penciled in to get more minutes than Dubois?

The answer is the theme of this article. Danault is safe and he's defensively responsible. He doesn't have significant offensive upside in terms of production, but he's an excellent middle-six center. Keeping Danault slotted as the team's second-line center represented safety. It didn't matter if it limited the team's offensive upside, the team wasn't concerned about offense.

Back to Dubois, this isn't to absolve him of blame in this failed first season. He needs to take a long, hard look in the mirror and determine how he wants his time in LA to go and whether or not he was all talk upon his arrival in LA. But we're not being objective if we don't acknowledge the Kings put him in a position to fail. We're also not being objective if we don't acknowledge the good that Dubois brought.

Per All Three Zones tracking, Dubois was the best on the team in passes that led to scoring chances, passes to the high-danger area, and was one of the most efficient Kings in carrying the puck with possession through the neutral zone and into the offensive zone. If he were doing those things with more ice time and more experienced linemates then maybe we'd have seen his production increase.

What's Next?

There will be plenty of time to dig into what the roster options are this offseason so we'll save that for a later date. A reminder though that the entire left side of the defense group is under contract so barring something surprising, we're in line for much of the same there, which we already know isn't good enough.

This organization needs a new direction. It needs forward-thinking management. This idea that "safe" and "defensive" hockey is the way to go is antiquated. It led to some of the inexcusable decisions laid out above.

LA has voluntarily rostered players with limited upside and, in turn, has voluntarily limited the upside of what this LA Kings team could have achieved. That's on the GM.

A new direction is needed behind the bench as well. Jim Hiller may end up being a fine NHL head coach. In his defense, this was the roster he had at his disposal. We may never know his preferences for the roster or system and, in many ways, he did the best he could. That said, there were enough questionable decisions that I think the organization needs to go in a different direction. I suspect a new GM would do that.

For Blake to not see what has worked around the NHL and what has not worked in his own roster build is enough to thank him for his service and move on.

The late Charlie Munger said, "It's good to learn from your mistakes. It's better to learn from other people's mistakes". Rob Blake did neither. Ownership hopefully will.

It's 2024, Los Angeles. Get with the times.

Data via Natural Stat Trick and All Three Zones

Main Photo Credit: Andy Devlin/NHLI via Getty Images

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