How Kyiv Plans to Use American Aid

Now that Congress has approved around $60 billion in military aid to Ukraine, Washington is racing to get military supplies to the war's front lines. It can't come soon enough. Over the last several weeks, Russian troops have captured a number of villages near the eastern city of Avdiivka. Moscow has reportedly been trying to advance its troops as far as possible into Ukrainian territory ahead of May 9, the highly symbolic anniversary of the day in 1945 when the Soviet Union announced victory over Nazi Germany. 

Kyiv has struggled to maintain its lines of resistance amid Russia's latest onslaught. Until Congress agreed to send more aid, Ukrainian soldiers had been severely rationing their use of ammunition, by some accounts firing just one shell for every dozen or so by the Russians.

With new U.S. funding finally secured, what military gear will Kyiv ask for? How might progress on the battlefield impact the chances for diplomacy? For answers, I spoke with Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine's minister of foreign affairs, on FP Live. Subscribers can watch the full interview in the video box atop this page, or on the FP Live podcast. What follows is a lightly edited transcript. 

Ravi Agrawal: What impact has the passage of the U.S. aid package had on morale in your government?

Dmytro Kuleba: Well, it was definitely a boost for morale among Ukrainian soldiers, and also among the people of Ukraine. If the package that was announced immediately after adoption of the law had contained a battery of Patriots [missile defense systems], this boost would have been even stronger among the people, because Ukrainians suffer the most from Russian missile attacks.

Russian ballistic missiles are the real scourge of this war. They've been mainly used recently to destroy our energy system. I will dare to say that if another country suffered this scale of energy destruction, it would look much, much worse than Ukraine. We hold on because we have learned a lot. We are resilient; we know what the stakes are. But just to give an understanding to your viewers, half our energy system is damaged and we still have to run the country, run the war effort, and rally the world's support.

RA: Does the aid package change your military strategy?

DK: There is a time gap between the announcement of the package and the moment when a Ukrainian artilleryman has more shells to fire back at the Russian invaders. And that moment has not come yet, because everything that was announced—we are grateful and we appreciate it—is still on its way. And therefore, in this time gap, bad things may happen, such as the advance of Russian forces on the ground.

The artillery ratio on the ground is incomprehensible. Basically, Ukrainian soldiers are starving because of the lack of artillery ammunition. And in the end, they get bombed and their positions get destroyed.

So, what really matters in terms of the war is not only the quantity and the quality of what is being provided, but also the timeline. And unfortunately, I have to admit that Ukraine's allies are behind schedule, despite their efforts. Some of them are making a great effort. But when I look at what Russia achieved in restoring the production of its defenders' industrial base and what the entire West has achieved so far, we have to face the truth and recognize that Russia is more effective in its war effort. And this raises a more fundamental question to the West. If it cannot be efficient enough in this particular war effort, then how efficient can it be if other wars and crises of the same scale break out?

RA: What types of weaponry are you prioritizing with the newly approved aid?

DK: We need artillery ammunition for the front line to stop Russia's advance. We need air defense systems and missile interceptors to stop Russian missiles falling—literally on the heads of Ukrainians and on our energy infrastructure. We need radio jamming because modern warfare is largely a war of drones and software. And therefore, you need an abundance of electronic warfare to combat these modern, state-of-the-art weapons.

RA: Has America's aid package energized Europe?

DK: I have to admit that between late autumn and April of this year, Europe was energizing the United States. Probably for the first time since World War II, Europe took the lead while the United States was, let's call it, deliberating some very important decisions.

Europe realized that it faced the reality of the war in Europe on its own, and it had to act. So they adopted a decision on opening EU accession talks with Ukraine. They introduced the EU-Ukraine Facility, which is a multiyear macrofinancial program of assistance. Individual member countries announced unprecedented packages of military assistance. In the volume of military assistance provided to Ukraine, Germany was second to the United States, a reality completely unimaginable even in the immediate aftermath of the invasion in 2022.

Now, of course, finally the United States made their decision. And we thank everyone who made it possible. Europe feels even more confident because they sense that America is back.

The question is, how long is it going to last given your political cycle? But I'm pretty certain that whatever the outcome of the political debates in the United States, the stakes for the United States in the war here in Ukraine are too high for Washington to withdraw in any form.

RA: When we last spoke at the Munich Security Conference in February, the issue of a potential Trump presidency came up. How worried are you about that now? 

DK: Listen, I am a Ukrainian who goes to bed in the evening not knowing whether a Russian missile will hit my house at night. What will be the reality that I will wake up in? Millions of Ukrainians feel the same. So the last thing I worry about is the outcome of elections in other countries, even in our most important ally, the United States. 

And it's not because I disrespect or ignore the political developments. It's just because life taught us to be ready for any scenario, to survive and prevail under any circumstances. You cannot imagine how many times we were told in the last two years to give up on the idea of full accession into the European Union. Even our closest friends advised us to accept half measures and to make compromises. We didn't, and we are on our path to membership. You cannot imagine how many people in the last months were telling us, "Don't insist on the military package being debated by the United States in its current form. Make compromises in order to get it." We didn't, because we know that when it comes to the matter of survival, you have to be tough and you have to be ready for any kind of scenario. And you have to insist on Plan A, which is the best plan for your country. This is wartime diplomacy. It's different from classic diplomacy.

RA: Republicans are trying to align on some aspects of foreign policy. The area they disagree on the most is Ukraine. J.D. Vance, a senator from Ohio, wrote in the New York Times recently that "Ukraine's challenge is not the GOP; it's math." He says you need more soldiers than you can ever field, and more weapons than America can ever provide. He also cites you specifically, saying that you keep asking for more Patriot interceptors, but you need thousands, while America only makes 550 of them a year. How do you respond to that?

DK: Well, first let's see the silver lining here. When I look at the votes cast by members of the Republican Party in both the houses of Congress, I don't get an impression that the opinion you mentioned represents the majority.

Second, if the war was only about math, you and I wouldn't be talking today because the position of the minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine would not exist anymore; we would have lost the war already. Look at the map and at the size of the country that invaded Ukraine. And then look at the size of Ukraine. By pure mathematical calculations, we were supposed to be swallowed. That was actually the projection of the best military and political analysts ahead of the invasion. I would like to remind everyone that we were given between seven and 10 days before everything would be done and partners would come to our funeral with solemn speeches about the importance of respecting international law and the rules-based order.

And this brings me to the third argument. Whether you are Republican or Democrat, you have to remember one thing. Security and prosperity of America stems from the current world order. If that world order ceases to exist, the security and prosperity of American taxpayers will be immediately under attack. And if you cannot satisfy the military needs, if you cannot produce enough interceptors to help Ukraine win the war against the country that wants to destroy the world order, then how are you going to win in the war against perhaps an enemy who is stronger than Russia? Think two steps ahead.

People come up with some of the most incredible arguments to explain why Ukraine does not deserve to be supported. But the very simple fact is, if you lose in Ukraine, it will have a domino effect and you will start losing everywhere. This is why I mentioned the difference in the defense industrial base between Russia and all our Western allies together. In two years of the war, Russia has become more efficient in producing weapons than the whole Western alliance. It's a bad sign. Things must change if we are serious about defending the world as we know it.

RA: As a condition of the recent aid deal, the Biden administration needs to submit a Ukraine strategy to Congress within 45 days. If you had to advise the Biden administration, what would that plan look like?

DK: Well, first, be ambitious. If you lower your expectations and start with what is usually called Plan B, you will end up with Plan B. So you have to start with Plan A.

Second, stop looking at Ukraine through the prism of relations with Russia. I'm aware that there are still ideas that whatever the outcome of this war, the U.S. will have to maintain relations with Russia, and therefore should avoid burning bridges. But you will not be able to afford any proper relationship with Russia under President [Vladimir] Putin because he made his choice, and that choice is war. If anyone thinks that here he's ramping up his defense industrial base only to fight Ukraine, they are completely wrong. So, consider Russia under Putin as an enemy.

Third point: Look for problems on your side and not on the side of Ukraine when you design your strategies. Ask yourselves: What are we doing wrong if we cannot help our ally prevail? Putting all the responsibility on the shoulders of Ukraine means consciously waiving yourself of responsibility. But every Russian missile that hits a Ukrainian energy facility deprives Ukrainians of electricity. If it kills civilians, it does that because someone did not supply an air defense system or an interceptor to help Ukraine avoid that. So this calculation should be present in all strategic calculations.

RA: Let's talk about diplomacy. Ukraine is unlikely to get a formal invitation to join NATO at the summit that's scheduled for July. Kyiv also wanted membership to the Joint Expeditionary Force, which is a British-led multinational military partnership, but it seems Washington won't allow that, either. What signal does all of this send to Russia?



DK: Well, the signal to Russia is simple: That part of Ukraine's future has not been decided yet. And that gives Russia hope. The law of the war is simple. The more uncertainty there is, the more resolve the enemy gets. We should all pursue a strategy under which the enemy has a crystal-clear understanding that Ukraine is part of the West, that allies will stand by Ukraine. Not as long as it takes, but as long as it takes Ukraine to win.

RA: I just mentioned two diplomatic things Ukraine won't get this summer. Let's talk about what it could get. You have leverage here because you have literal bodies on the line. Europe knows that and is grateful. So, my question is this: If Brussels could demand something from America on your behalf, something that Washington can do without involving Congress again, what would that be?

DK: I'm thinking about only one thing: air defense. Because air defense is something that our economy depends on, as do our cities and our civilians' lives. I'm tired of urging [the world] to work harder and double and triple the work on this, because everyone knows where these systems are. Everyone knows what needs to be done to deliver them to Ukraine. So our appeal is: "Just do it."

Politically, Europe is doing pretty well because its message on Ukraine's membership to the European Union is crystal clear: Ukraine will be there and is on its way to getting there. While the message of NATO certainly requires additional clarification, we all know that we will be there, but we need more clarity on the timeline and the next steps.

The third issue that Brussels and Washington can work on together are Russian frozen assets. This is something that is in the hands of our partners. The United States has to be commended here because they hold a more advanced and tough position on this than Europe. So this is where Washington has to work more with European allies to address some of their concerns and make this money available for the war effort, because it will also relieve the pressure on the budgets of our allies. So these are the three issues that I would encourage Brussels and Washington to work on more actively.

RA: Switzerland is holding a high-level peace conference next month. Your Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, described Switzerland as openly hostile. What is the point of a peace summit without the party that initiated the war?

DK: Your point is valid if you address the war that Russia launched against Ukraine with textbook diplomacy, because all textbooks that we learned from tell us that you need two parties to sit down and negotiate.

Our approach comes from reality, and from the experience that we gained between 2014 and 2022, because the aggression against Ukraine started in 2014. Between 2014 and 2022, we had almost 200 rounds of talks with Russia in different formats, with mediators and bilaterally. But nothing worked. It ended up in the large-scale invasion [of 2022]. 

So we know that it doesn't make sense to have Russia at the table if you cannot ensure that they act in good faith. There are only two ways to bring Russia to a situation where it will act in good faith. The first one is success on the battlefield, and the second one is having a coalition of countries who share the same principles and the same approaches. So this is why the summit does not intend to have Russia as a participant. Because the goal of this summit is to unite countries who share principles and approaches that they will build further actions on.

After that, communication with Russia may take place and Russia can be part of the talks. Because you are right: In the end, you cannot put the war to an end without both parties.

RA: Russia has broken several rules of the international order, thereby making it difficult to exert more pressure on it globally. But one country that can exert some pressure on Russia is China. Chinese President Xi Jinping is headed to Europe next week. What would it take for Beijing to change its approach to Russia and its so-called no-limits friendship with Moscow?

DK: When we approach a country from the perspective of "it's impossible to make them accept responsibility for their crimes, and it's impossible to change them, so let's try to change the victim of their crimes instead," this is called appeasement of an aggressor. If this is the policy that anyone wants to pursue under solemn cover of different foreign-policy concepts and peace efforts, then this war will lead to even greater war, as we know from history. So appeasement is not the solution.

And that brings us to the China-Russia relationship. I think you are absolutely correct in assuming that China has leverage on Russia. China can do more to convince Russia to change its behavior. And we, along with other European leaders, are talking with them about that. This is why we invited China to take part in the peace formula summit.

But also, there is another element in this construction. Some countries believe that Russia shouldn't be pushed too far away in order to avoid a situation where Russia completely falls into the hands of China. And that imposes constraints on decisions taken with regard to supporting Ukraine. But the truth is that Russia is already in the hands of China. And there is nothing, nothing, that can bring them back into a different reality. So this is just a wrong way of looking at the new balance that has been created.

RA: That's the story with China. And we know India is buying a lot more Russian oil than it used to. Is it fair to say that Kyiv's outreach to the global south has largely failed? If so, why do you think that's the case?

DK: If I look at the number of votes cast by the so-called countries of the global south for the U.N. General Assembly resolutions on the issue of Russian aggression against Ukraine, I don't get an impression that they are lost, because many of them vote in favor of these resolutions. But the truth is that when you fight a war, the support that you receive is multilayered. Some provide you with weapons; others limit themselves just to pressing the green button in the UNGA twice a year.

 So what I learned about the global south in the last two years is that it doesn't exist, that we have to treat every country separately. There is a huge difference between China and India or between South Africa and Brazil. The mistake that we made with regards to them was not made in 2022. It was in the late 1990s, when we started paying attention to developing relations with these countries while Russia inherited a lot from the Soviet Union. I have to admit, they are better positioned there. But it doesn't mean that we shouldn't keep trying.